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THE MUHAMMAD ALI BOXING REFORM ACT:
THE FIRST JAB AT ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY IN
PROFESSIONAL BOXING
Scott Baglio
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, former heavyweight champion of the world, Mike Tyson,
was released from prison and subsequently earned approximately
$140 million over the course of his next six fights.! According to a
complaint filed in federal court, $45 million of that money was
misappropriated by his promoter, Don King.2 The complaint further
alleges that King took advantage of Tyson's inability to read and fully
understand business contracts, which resulted in agreements that
required Tyson to pay consulting fees to King's wife, son, daughter,
and son-in-law.3 Tyson was also billed for "travel expenses incurred
by King and those who traveled with him to meet Tyson as well as the
cost of security, corporate cars, renovations at King's businesses,
unusually large purses to other undercard fighters promoted by King,
and fees for King's legal battles."4 King was allegedly able to defraud
Tyson of over $100 million through conduct that began in the late
1980s, because Tyson had entrusted him with complete control of
Tyson's business and financial interests.' In fact, after separating from
King, Tyson's new accountant was unable to obtain Tyson's financial
records because they were kept in filing cabinets owned by King.6
* I would like to thank my family and my girlfriend, Christine, for their constant
love and support. Special thanks to New York State Senator Roy Goodman's office,
Lou DiBella of HBO Sports, and Paul Johnson of the Boxing Organizing Committee
for supplying materials for this Note. Special thanks also to Lou DiBella and
Professor Joseph Perillo, for their critique of this work, and to Fordham University
School of Law for giving me the opportunity to publish this piece.
1. See Mike Tyson Files $100 Million Lawsuit Against "'Pal" Don King, L.A.
Sentinel, Mar. 18, 1998, at A2.
2- See Thomas Heath, Tyson's Suit is Break with King: Boxer Alleges Promoter
Defrauded Him, Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1998, at B4.
3. See Mike Tyson Files $100 Million Lawsuit Against "Pal" Don King, supra
note 1.
4. d.
5. See Heath, supra note 2.
6. See Mike Tyson Files $100 Million Lawsuit Against "Pal" Don King, supra
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Though these charges may sound shocking, allegations and actual
abuses of this type are commonplace in the world of professional
boxing.7 Given the high degree of abuse experienced by boxers at the
hands of unscrupulous promoters and handlers, boxing, more than any
other sport, is in need of major reforms and outside regulation.
Because it is the only industry that operates without a private
governing organization, or according to uniform business practices,
boxing is unique among professional sports.8  Due to these
deficiencies, boxers have often been exploited by unethical parties
who control the boxing industry.' In response to these abuses,
Congress has frequently held hearings and conducted investigations
over the last several decades concerning the extensive scandals in the
sport."0 The federal government has attempted to regulate the sport
several times," but has been successful only once. 2  The main
argument sounded by opponents of federal legislation is that if other
professional sports are not government-regulated, then boxing should
not be either.13 This argument against federal intervention fails to
acknowledge that federal regulation is mandatory because boxing is
the only professional sport that refuses to regulate itself.4
Senator John McCain has co-sponsored a bill entitled the
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act ("Ali Act") 5 aimed at
establishing uniform business and contractual standards to prevent the
note 1.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See H.R. 1832, 106th Cong. § 2(1) (1999).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See Lawrence Bershad & Richard J. Ensor, Boxing in the United States:
Reform, Abolition or Federal Control? A New Jersey Case Study, 19 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 865, 880, 900-12 (1989); Peter E. Millspaugh, The Federal Regulation of
Professional Boxing: Will Congress Answer the Bell?, 19 Seton Hall Legis. J. 33, 33-
34, 43-44 (1994).
11. For a discussion of the legislation that was proposed but never enacted, see
April R. Anderson, The Punch That Landed: The Professional Boxing Safety Act of
1996, 9 Marq. Sports L.J. 191, 194-98 (1998); Kelly C. Howard, Regulating the Sport of
Boxing-Congress Throws the First Punch with the Professional Boxing Safety Act, 7
Seton Hall J. Sport L. 103, 106-114 (1997); infra Part III.A.
12. The one proposal that was enacted into law is the Professional Boxing Safety
Act of 1996, which regulates health and safety procedures prior, during, and
subsequent to boxing matches. See Pub. L. No. 104-272, 110 Stat. 3309-13 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-13 (Supp. IV 1998)).
13. See Arlin R. Crisco, Note, Fighting Outside the Ring: A Labor Alternative to
the Continued Federal Regulation of Professional Boxing, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1139, 1163-
64 (1999).
14. See Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing Regulations
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 103d Cong. 82 (1994)
[hereinafter Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing] (testimony of
Sen. William V. Roth, Jr.) (stating that "the boxing industry has regretfully proved to
be incapable of effective self-regulation, and that the current State-based regulatory
structure is in need of major overhaul.").
15. See H.R. 1832, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999).
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exploitation of boxers.1 6 After two votes of passage in the Senate, and
one in the House of Representatives, the Ali Act was never brought
to a final vote in 1999, due to the use of "arcane Senate rules"
employed by two Democratic Senators to block the vote. 7 The bill is
once again pending in Congress, and was recently passed by the
Senate on April 7, 2000. This Note argues for the passage of the Ali
Act as a necessary first step toward eventually establishing private
regulation for the sport.
Part I discusses the current structure of the boxing industry,
including a description of the major parties and a comparison with
other sports. Part I examines how the current system is corrupted,
specifically discussing contractual abuses, rankings abuses, and
improprieties caused by improper judge selection and compensation.
Part III discusses the background of the Ali Act and examines specific
provisions aimed at remedying the abuses discussed in Part II.
Finally, Part IV discusses why the Ali Act is an appropriate starting
point for the regulation of boxing, additional regulations that are
required to protect boxers, and why the best final solution is private
regulation. This Note concludes that unless Congress is willing to
accept the perpetuation of the exploitation of professional boxers, the
All Act is a necessity.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF PROFESSIONAL BOXING
In order to understand the many opportunities that arise for various
parties to exploit professional boxers, it is first important to
comprehend the duties of those parties and their responsibilities while
operating in the boxing industry. This part discusses the
responsibilities of managers, promoters, and sanctioning organizations
and describes how the current system operates in theory. It then
16. See id § 1.
17. See McCain Disappointed Boxing Reform Didn't Pass This Year, Government
Press Releases, November 19, 1999, available in 1999 WL 28846526. Because a hold
was put on the bill during the final night that the Senate was in session for 1999, the
identity of the Senator who held up the bill did not have to be disclosed. Several
Senators, however, have identified Senator Harry Reid of Nevada as being
responsible for blocking the vote. Recently, Reid released a list of donors to his
campaign that included the names of the two most powerful promoters in boxing,
Don King and Bob Arum. King's $50,000 contribution was the largest given to the
campaign, while Arum contributed $10,000. See Jack Newfield, Don Sent Senate Hit
Man to KO McCain Boxing Bill, N.Y. Post, Mar. 24, 2000, at 6. Nevada generates a
tremendous amount of money from boxing's current system, and Senator Reid has
stated in the past that his two most important constituents are King and Arum. See
Fourth Annual Fordham University School of Law Sports Law Symposium, Union
Formation in Pro Boxing 66 (Mar. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Fordham Sports Law
Symposium Transcript] (unpublished transcript, on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (statement of Jay Larkin, Senior Vice President Showtime Sports and Event
Programming).
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compares this system to the organizational and regulatory structures
of other professional sports.
A. Managers, Promoters, State Boxing Commissions, And
Sanctioning Organizations
Professional boxing is a multi-billion dollar industry that conducts a
significant portion of its business within the United States. 8 Since
1993, professional boxing events in the United States have increased
by an average of 3% each year, resulting in over 800 events in 1997.11
Although boxing is a wealthy industry, of the approximately 8,000
licensed professional boxers in the United States, very few earn a
significant amount of money.2' Most boxers are uneducated men who
come from impoverished backgrounds, and boxing is their only means
of supporting themselves and their families." This lack of education
and business experience makes boxers susceptible to exploitation
from the numerous savvy parties with whom they come into contact
during their careers.
The boxing industry is comprised of many parties who influence
and direct a boxer's career. Generally, before a bout can take place,
several business transactions must be completed. A boxer must first
hire a manager, who then represents the boxer in all business
negotiations in exchange for a percentage of the boxer's purse for
each bout.22 The boxer and manager must then negotiate with a
promoter, who agrees to provide a certain number of bouts and
compensation for each bout, in exchange for exclusive promotional
rights to the boxer.' Each bout in which a boxer participates is
regulated by the boxing commission of the state in which the bout
takes place. State commissions are responsible for establishing and
18. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transp., 105th Cong. 43 (1998) [hereinafter Hearings on
Business Practices in Boxing] (testimony of Gregory P. Sirb, President, ABC) (stating
that approximately 50% of world title bouts are held in the United States); Fordham
Sports Law Symposium Transcript, supra note 17, at 38 (statement of Jay Larkin,
Senior Vice President, Showtime Sports and Event Programming) (stating that a bout
between Mike Tyson and Evander Holyfield grossed $120 million in one night, the
equivalent of the movie "Titanic" playing for four weeks on 2000 movie screens).
19. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 43 (testimony
of Gregory P. Sirb, President, ABC).
20. See Hearings on Revision of Boxing Regulation Before the House Subcomm.
on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 106th Cong. (1999),
available in Westlaw, U.S. Testimony [hereinafter Hearings on Revision of Boxing
Regulation] (testimony of Gregory P. Sirb, President, ABC); Hearings on Business
Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 2 (statement of Sen. John McCain).
21. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 2 (statement of
Sen. John McCain); see also Fordham Sports Law Symposium Transcript, supra note
17, at 59-60 (statement of Louis DiBella, Senior Vice President, HBO Sports) (stating
that less than 50% of professional boxers have high school educations).
22. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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enforcing health and safety procedures, and for selecting the judges
for non-championship bouts. 24 As a boxer advances through his
career and becomes successful, his goal is to be ranked as a contender
in his weight class, and eventually to be recognized as world
champion. Rankings are determined by numerous sanctioning
organizations that are responsible for recognizing a world champion
and the ten leading contenders in each weight class.' Thus, before a
bout can successfully take place, numerous interactions take place
between the aforementioned parties.
A manager is responsible for handling all of the boxer's business
affairs, including the selection of a promoter, the negotiating of
contractual terms with that promoter, the selection of a trainer, and
approving the opponents for the fighter.' Early in a boxer's career,
the manager is also usually responsible for paying the training
expenses and providing a stipend on which the boxer lives.- The
manager and trainer are generally compensated by receiving a
combined 33.3% of the boxer's purse for each fightY The boxer's
purse is contractually guaranteed prior to each bout and is not altered
by the outcome of the match. 9  The manager's compensation
arrangement provides a major incentive to negotiate shrewdly with
the promoter, because more money paid to the boxer translates into
more money for the manager.
A promoter contracts with a boxer and agrees to provide a certain
number of fights each year at a minimum compensation in exchange
for exclusive promotional rights to the boxer.- The promoter is the
party who assumes the financial risk for the promotion of each match
by guaranteeing each fighter a certain purse, and by paying all of the
expenses of the promotion.31 The promoter is not supposed to receive
a percentage of the boxer's purse, but rather is compensated by the
difference between the total revenues and total expenses for the
promotion of a bout.32 The revenue generated from a boxing match
generally comes from three sources.3 The first is the fight's live gate,
24. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
26. See Crisco, supra note 13, at 1144-45; see also Ronald Grover & Jennifer
Reingold, The P.T. Barnum of Fist City, Business Week, Nov. 18, 1996, at 96, 100
(quoting boxing historian Bert Sugar as saying "Itihe function of a good manager...
is getting the most money for the least risk").
27. See Crisco, supra note 13, at 1145.
28. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 9 (presentation
by Fredric G. Levin).
29. See id. at 42 (testimony of Cedric Kushner, boxing promoter) (stating that a
long-term contract benefits the boxer because it guarantees him an income).
30. See Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741,748 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
31. See Hearing on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 10 (presentation
by Fredric G. Levin).
32. See id.
33. See Thomas Hauser, The Black Lights: Inside the World of Professional
2000] 2261
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which results from either the renting of an arena and sale of tickets, or
for major fights that take place in a casino setting, from a site fee paid
to the promoter, with the casino maintaining responsibility for the
distribution of tickets.34 The second and most significant source of
revenue is the sale of domestic and foreign television rights to the
fight.35 The third source of income is derived from the sale of
advertising rights, videocassettes, and fight programs. 6
A promoter's interests are in direct conflict with those of the boxer,
because the less money a boxer accepts for a particular bout, the more
profits are available for the promoter. Because this conflict of interest
exists, it is essential that the manager negotiate vigorously on behalf
of the boxer, and that both parties have relatively equal bargaining
power so that one side is not forced to accede to unconscionable
contractual terms.37
State boxing commissions are the only entities that have statutory
authority to regulate boxing matches. 8 As such, state commissions
are specifically responsible for establishing and enforcing policies
designed to protect the health and safety of boxers.39 These policies
include keeping track of boxers' records, conducting medical
examinations, and suspending boxers for medical or administrative
reasons.4" State commissions are also responsible for selecting and/or
approving officials for non-championship bouts.4 Forty-four states
have established a boxing commission, each having its own rules and
procedures. 4 2 Recently, the various state commissions have begun to
work together in an effort to establish unified rules through the
formation of the Association of Boxing Commissions ("ABC").43
Sanctioning organizations are involved only with championship and
Boxing 69-70 (1986).
34. See id. at 70.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Hearing on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 10 (presentation
by Fredric G. Levin) ("The job of the promoter is to go out and get as much money as
he possibly can get from television, from the site, from foreign rights, from
sponsorships, etc., and then to pay the fighter as little as he possibly can. The reason
for this is the difference goes to the promoter.").
38. See Hearings on Revision of Boxing Regulation, supra note 20 (testimony of
Gregory P. Sirb, President, ABC).
39. See id.
40. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 44 (testimony
of Gregory P. Sirb, President, ABC).
41. See Report Issued by the New York State Senate Committee on
Investigations, Taxation, and Government Operations, Cleaning Up the Ring: A
Blueprint for Boxing Reform, November 1999, at 14-15 [hereinafter A Blueprint for
Boxing Reform].
42. See id. at 23-24 (stating that under the current system, promoters often look
for the state with the least demanding regulations).
43. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 43-44
(testimony of Gregory P. Sirb, President, ABC) (outlining the unification efforts since
the passage of the Professional Boxing Safety Act).
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title-elimination matches.4 The three major sanctioning bodies are
the International Boxing Federation ("IBF"), the World Boxing
Association ("WBA"), and the World Boxing Council ("WBC").!5
Each of these organizations designates a world champion in each
weight division, and also ranks the top ten to twenty contenders per
division. 7 The power of these organizations is derived from the fact
that without their official sanction, a fight cannot be recognized as a
"championship bout," and thus is less attractive to both television and
the viewing public." For each bout sanctioned by one of these
organizations, there is a sanction fee charged that is usually 3% of
each fighter's purse.49 Boxers are also charged specific fees for the
selection of officials, including judges and referees.' Each
organization has its own variation of rules, but generally a champion is
required to face the top contender at least once every nine months,51
and can only defend his title against the top 15 contenders.' The
designation as number one contender is a very important distinction
because only that boxer is guaranteed an opportunity to fight for the
title.
For non-championship bouts, judges are selected by the state
athletic commission responsible for supervising the bout. 3 Although
state commission rules make no exception for championship bouts,
judges for title bouts are usually named by the sanctioning
organization, sometimes subject to the approval of the state
commission.' Judges are paid by promoters and are provided a
44. See Hauser, supra note 33, at 93.
45. See Hearing on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 9 (presentation
by Fredric G. Levin).
46. There are currently seventeen weight classes ranging from 105 lbs. to
unlimited heavyweights. The weight classifications are as follows: strawweights-105
lbs.; junior flyweights-108 lbs.; flyweights-1 12 lbs.; junior bantamweights-1 15 lbs.;
bantamweights-118 lbs.; junior featherweights-122 lbs.; featherweights-126 lbs.;
junior lightweights-130 lbs.; lightweights-135 lbs.; junior welterweights-140 lbs.;
welterweights-147 lbs.; junior middleweights-154 lbs.; middleweights-160 lbs.;
super middleweights-168 lbs.; light heavyweights-175 lbs.; cruiserweights-190 lbs.;
and heavyweights-unlimited. See The Ring Rankings. The Ring. August 1999, at 14-
15.
47. See Hauser, supra note 33, at 93-94.
48. See Hearings on Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, S.2238 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 105th Cong. 34 (1998) [hereinafter
Hearings on the Ali Act] (statement of Walter R. Stone, General Counsel, IBF)
(discussing how sanctioning organizations were derived from television's desire to air
only championship bouts).
49. See Hearing on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18. at 10 (presentation
by Fredric G. Levin).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 9.
52 See WBC Rules & Regulations: Championship and Elimination Rules, Rule
1.20 (visited Mar. 2,2000) <http'//vwv.wbcboxing.com/articlesrulesl.htm>.
53. See A Blueprint for Boxing Reform. supra note 41, at 14-15.
54. See A Public Hearing on Professional Boxing Before the New York State
Senate ConznL on Investigations, Taxation, and Gov't Operations 78 (1999)
2000] 2263
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specific fee for the bout, along with reimbursement for travel, food,
and entertainment. 5 The compensation for each judge is sometimes
distributed by the sanctioning organization, and other times by the
promoter himself.5 6
A boxer can achieve a successful career only if all of these parties
perform their obligations. Because this does not always occur, a boxer
can be very successful inside the ring, but have little to show
financially if the manager has not vigorously negotiated for his
interests. In addition, victories inside the ring can be meaningless if
the promoter does not supply the boxer with frequent bouts against
respected competition. Boxers are also at the mercy of sanctioning
organizations, because without their recognition of a boxer as a top
contender, the boxer may never get an opportunity to fight for a
championship. Thus, no matter how talented a particular boxer may
be, he can only be guaranteed a fair opportunity at success if all
parties fulfill their roles in an honest and faithful manner.
B. A Comparison to Other Sports
Several features distinguish the structure of the boxing industry
from those of other sports, including the lack of an independent
governing organization, the nature of the rankings system, the lack of
a players' association or union, and the unavailability of arbitration to
settle disputes within the industry.
The first factor that differentiates boxing from other sports is the
lack of an independent governing body. 7 The four major professional
team sports-baseball, basketball, football, and hockey-are each
operated through a league that handles the day-to-day operations of
the sport and "provides for the planning, supervision, and control of
corporate enterprise decisions. 5 8  For example, the National
Basketball Association is an independent entity that oversees twenty-
nine professional teams through the establishment of uniform
[hereinafter New York State Senate Hearings] (testimony of Louis DiBella, Senior
Vice President HBO/Time Warner Sports) ("Right now judges are selected by the
rankings organizations sometimes subject to the approval or a pool selection by state
athletic commissions but selected by the rankings organizations nonetheless.").
55. See id. at 78 (testimony of Louis DiBella, Senior Vice President HBO/Time
Warner Sports) (stating that promoters pay for travel, hotel accommodations, per
diem, and entertainment for the judges of a bout); id. at 44 (testimony of Don King,
boxing promoter) (stating that a promoter pays the costs of the judges at the direction
of the sanctioning organizations).
56. See id. at 44-45 (testimony of Don King, boxing promoter).
57. See Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 6 (statement of Sen. John
McCain) ("More than any other major sports industry in the United States,
professional boxing needs a strong, central league or association of its business
leaders and a representative body to serve the interests of the boxers, yet professional
boxing has neither.").
58. Paul D. Staudohar, Playing for Dollars: Labor Relations and the Sports
Business 8 (1996).
[Vol, 682264
MUHAMMAD ALl BOXING REFORM ACT
regulations and the approval of franchises and licensing agreements. 9
These leagues handle a variety of responsibilities, including the
creation of schedules and rules under which the games are to be
played, the development of global marketing plans for the sport, and
the control of corporate sponsorships and licensing of league-related
products.6°  The leagues are also responsible for "negotiating
collective bargaining agreements, setting rules for drafting of players,
determining policies for the enforcement of management rights, and
negotiating national television agreements. ' 61 Independent governing
bodies also exist in individual sports, such as golf and tennis, and are
responsible for scheduling events and providing uniform regulations
for their athletes.62
The use of an independent organization to govern a sport provides
unified rules that apply to all competitors and teams, and in the
process, monitors the general welfare of the players and franchises
and public confidence in the sport. The independent organizations
enforce their rules and regulations through the imposition of fines,
bans, and suspensions.63 Thus, the parties in the industry must follow
the established rules or else be subjected to monetary penalties or be
prevented from participating in the sport.
The second major distinction between boxing and other sports is
the rankings system and recognition of world champions. Professional
team sports all measure standings based on a team's win-loss record
during the regular season.' Based on these records, a certain number
of teams become eligible for the league playoffs. The eligible teams
59. See NBA @ Work: Overview: Inside the League Office (visited Feb. 24,2000)
<http://vww.nba.com/nbaatwork/organization/00616994.html>.
60. See id.
61. Staudohar, supra note 58, at 8.
62. See, e.g., Patty Maitland, Riding a Cart on Golfs "Unfairivays": Martin v.
PGA Tour, 29 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 627, 637-38 (1999) (stating that the
Professional Golf Association currently organizes three professional golf tours, and
oversees approximately 23,000 professional golfers).
63. See 1 Martin J. Greenberg & James T. Gray, Sports Law Practice § 2.11(1), at
216 (2d ed. 1998).
64. See The 2000 ESPN Information Please Sports Almanac 71, 219, 349, 391
(1999) [hereinafter ESPN Sports Almanac] (illustrating the 1999 final regular season
standings in Major League Baseball ("MLB"), the National Football League
("NFL"), the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), and the National Hockey
League ("NHL")).
65. MLB is divided into the American and National Leagues, each consisting of
East, Central, and West Divisions. The team with the best regular season record in
each division qualifies for the playoffs, along with one team from each league that has
the best record of the remaining teams. See id. at 71. The NFL is divided into an
American Football Conference and a National Football Conference, each consisting
of Eastern, Central, and Western Divisions. The team with the best regular season
record in each division qualifies for the playoffs, along with the three teams from each
conference 'vith the best records among the remaining teams. See id. at 219. The
NBA is divided into an Eastern Conference, consisting of an Atlantic and Central
Division, and a Western Conference, consisting of a Midwest and Pacific Division.
20001 2265
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are then seeded based on their records, and proceed through several
best-of-five or best-of-seven game series until there is only one team
remaining.66 The team that is able to move through the playoffs
without losing a series is recognized as world champion.67 Therefore,
there are no subjective elements in the rankings of these sports, the
entire process is determined by the outcome of each team's games. In
the sport of boxing, however, because there are so many professional
boxers, it would be impossible for a boxer to face all of the other
boxers in his weight division in order to determine who should be the
champion. For this reason, boxing rankings are more subjective
because they consider factors such as quality of opposition and quality
of wins, which can differ based on individual opinions.'
Boxing also differs in this respect from other individual professional
sports, such as golf and tennis, which determine rankings through a
point system based on the position in which a competitor finishes in
particular events.69 Different events are given different point values,
and players are able to choose the events in which they will compete.
At the end of the year, the player with the most cumulative points is
recognized as the singles champion of either the men's or women's
division.7" Again, no subjective criteria are considered in determining
a player's ranking, whereas in boxing the rankings are entirely
subjective.
Several college team sports employ a subjective rankings system
that considers many factors. Both college football and basketball
determine rankings through polls that consider such factors as win-
loss records, strength of schedule, and quality of opposition.7 The
difference between the poll system and the rankings system used in
The team with the best record in each division qualifies for the playoffs, along with
the six teams in each conference with the best records among the remaining teams.
See id. at 349. The NHL is divided into an Eastern Conference, consisting of
Northeast, Atlantic, and Southeast Divisions, and a Western Conference, consisting
of Central. Northwest, and Pacific Divisions. The team with the best regular season
record in each division qualifies for the playoffs, along with the five teams from each
conference with the best records among the remaining teams. See id. at 391.
66. See id. at 87-93, 232-34, 359-60, 403-05 (illustrating the progression of the 1999
playoffs of MLB, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL resulting in the designation of one
team as champion).
67. See id.
68. See infra Part II.B.
69. Rankings in professional tennis are determined by computer points from each
player's fourteen best tournament finishes over the preceding twelve months. See
ESPN Sports Almanac, supra note 64, at 821. Rankings in professional golf are
determined by points awarded for a player's finish in worldwide tournaments. Final
point averages are calculated by dividing a player's total points by the number of
tournaments participated in over the previous two-year period. The player with the
highest average is recognized as the number one golfer in the world. See id. at 849.
70. See id. at 821,849.
71. See id. at 147, 285; Tim Layden, Special Team: Unbeaten and Unabashed
Virginia Tech Has Proved Itself Worthy of Playing for the National Title, Sports
Illustrated, Dec. 6, 1999, at 52, 55.
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boxing, however, is that the ratings of college team sports are
determined by newspaper writers who cover the particular sport and
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") officials, parties
with no financial interest in the outcome of the rankings process.-
Because unbiased parties determine the ratings, they are more
credible and lead to more competitive contests in determining which
team is the best, as compared with boxing, which tends to produce
questionable or controversial rankings because they are often
manipulated by parties with a financial interest in the outcome of the
rankings.73
The structure of the boxing industry is also different from that of
other sports in that other athletes are represented through a players'
association or union, while there is no such group for boxers.74 These
associations are responsible for handling all general negotiations
between the players and the league, and for representing the interests
of the players in all disputes with either league or team officials.75
Unions have also been responsible for establishing pension funds for
the players they represent. 6  As with independent governing
organizations, players' associations are not limited to team sports, but
are also prevalent in the other major individual sports.' Players'
associations or unions are an important factor in the protection of
player interests, and in equalizing bargaining power in negotiations
between players and team management.78 These organizations
strengthen the infrastructure of other sports, and along with the
credibility of their rankings, provide heightened protection against
athlete abuse.
The formation of players' associations and unions in professional
sports has also given rise to another distinction between boxing and
72. See ESPN Sports Almanac, supra note 64, at 147,285.
73. See infra Part II.A.
74. See H.R. 1832, 106th Cong. § 2(1) (1999).
75. See Staudohar, supra note 58, at 8. In order for a sports union to achieve its
goals, it
(1) engages in organizing its membership for solidarity, (2) negotiates
contracts applicable to all players, (3) uses pressure tactics such as strikes
and picketing, if necessary, (4) enforces the terms of the negotiated
agreement through the grievance procedure, and (5) serves an internal
governmental function in conducting meetings, voting on contracts
negotiated, and providing other means of communication to members.
Id Players' associations exist to represent the interests of the athletes in every other
major sport. See id- at 27, 65, 104, 148 (discussing the formation and actions of players'
associations in baseball, football, basketball, and hockey).
76. See Crisco, supra note 13, at 1143.
77. See Fordham Sports Law Symposium Transcript, supra note 17, at 8
(statement of Rich Rose) (discussing the possibility of union formation in boxing,
which has already been accomplished in golf, tennis, and the four major team sports).
78. See Crisco, supra note 13, at 1164-65 (stating that the "unionization of
professional athletes in team sports dramatically improved working conditions and
financial stability").
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other sports-the existence of a system of arbitration. 79 Arbitration is
an alternate forum of dispute resolution that results in quicker, more
efficient solutions of disputes than if matters are pursued through the
court system. 0  The four major team sports-baseball, football,
basketball, and hockey-all employ both grievance and salary
arbitration, which dictate that a neutral party make a binding decision
following an evidentiary hearing."1 Arbitration "works quickly and
fairly and encourages [all] parties to adopt a realistic, good faith
bargaining position."'  The quick resolution of disputes is a necessity
in industries where participants have a relatively short period of
participation. The lack of a system of arbitration in boxing leaves
boxers with the inadequate remedy of long, drawn-out courtroom
proceedings.83
Contrary to the current structure of the boxing industry, other
professional sports have developed systems that protect the rights and
interests of all parties involved. Independent governing organizations
are used to create uniform standards that all members of the industry
are required to follow. Fair ranking procedures are important
because they ensure that the most deserving teams and individuals
will be properly recognized and rewarded, thus increasing athlete and
public confidence. Players' associations or unions are crucial in
representing the interests of the athletes and safeguarding them from
exploitation. In the event that a dispute does arise, the existence of an
arbitration mechanism provides a quick resolution so that athletes'
careers do not stall. Because boxing does not feature many of these
elements, professional boxers are more likely to be exploited by the
power brokers of their sport. The next part describes in detail the
abuses that boxers face, focusing on contractual and rankings
manipulations.
II. ABUSES IN THE BOXING INDUSTRY
Unlike other professional and college sports, which are generally
free of athlete abuse, the abuses in boxing are numerous.8" Many of
the opportunities for manipulation result from an unequal balance of
power, in which promoters and sanctioning bodies can force boxers to
accept their contractual terms and fees.85 This part discusses the
79. See Staudohar, supra note 58, at 9.
80. See Jeffrey D. Meyer, Note, The NFLPA's Arbitration Procedure: A Forum
for Professional Football Players and Their Agents to Resolve Disputes, 6 Ohio St. J.
on Disp. Resol. 107, 108, 127 (1990).
81. See Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional
Baseball, 1 Sports L. J. 183, 199 (1994).
82. Id. at 204.
83. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
84. See infra Part II.A-C.
85. See Hearings on H.R. 1832, the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act Before the
House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, 106th
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abuses and exploitation that result from contractual terms between
promoters and boxers, from the rankings process, and from the system
employed for the selection and compensation of boxing judges.
A. Contractual Abuses
When an amateur boxer decides to turn professional, he must sign a
contract with a promoter in order to compete at all. The
negotiations of these contracts are often one-sided because "[t]he
average fighter has virtually no bargaining power or leverage."' This
disparity in bargaining power often leads to contracts "which are for
extended or unlimited terms, place little or no obligations on the
promoter and provide for little guaranteed compensation to the
boxer, beyond bare minimums."'  Current boxing contracts thus act
to eliminate the risks for promoters associated with signing a boxer,
because if the boxer succeeds, the promoter will reap great financial
rewards, while if the boxer fails to achieve success, the promoter loses
nothing.8 9
In contracts between a boxer and promoter, especially those signed
early in a boxer's career, the provision stating the term of the contract
is very important because of the impact it can have in later
negotiations. Though a boxer may have little bargaining power during
the initial stages of his career, rising to contender or champion status
obviously provides greater negotiating leverage. The boxer would
therefore benefit most if the initial contract was for a term of only a
few years, which would permit renegotiation of contractual terms
should the boxer experience early success. Although most
promotional contracts extend for terms of two to four years, the most
successful boxers are not permitted to renegotiate due to the use of a
term that has become standard in the boxing industry."° This term
provides that while the contract covers a specified number of years, in
the event that the boxer is ever recognized as "world champion," the
term is extended to include the entire title reign plus two years
beyond the date that the boxer loses the title." This automatic
extension has the effect of contractually binding a champion boxer to
Cong. 2 (1999) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1832] (statement of Louis DiBella,
Senior Vice President Time Warner SportsIHBO Sports).
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See A Blueprint for Boxing Reform, supra note 41, at 16.
90. See Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
("The subsequent change in Douglas' relative fortunes does not provide a legal basis
now to disregard his prior agreement as to the reasonable floor at which to begin
discussion of the value of his services as defending heavyweight champion.").
91. See Trinidad v. King, No. 98 CIV. 4518, 1998 WL 823653. at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
24,1998); Douglas, 742 F. Supp. at 748.
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one promoter for his entire career without ever having a chance to
renegotiate.92
Another term that is essential to the fighter is one that provides that
he is to participate in a minimum number of bouts each year.93 A
minimum bout obligation ensures that the fighter will have steady and
regular employment, and will not be contractually bound to a
promoter who does nothing to further the boxer's career. 4 Forcing
the promoter to guarantee a certain number of bouts each year is also
important because it reduces some of the promoter's power during
negotiations of the boxer's purse, which is negotiated separately prior
to each fight." Without such a term, a boxer is forced to accept
whatever purse the promoter offers, or else be prevented from
competing at all.96 Because initially a boxer has little or no bargaining
power, however, a minimum bout obligation will be unlikely to appear
in the initial contract. 7
Although boxers are the weaker parties in contract negotiations
with promoters, they lose all bargaining power when they are not
represented by a manager who bargains for their best interests.98 The
traditional system of negotiating,9 9 in which a manager bargains on a
boxer's behalf, has been replaced in many respects over the last
several decades by other methods that all operate to boxers'
detriment."° The ideal scenario for a promoter is to serve in a dual
role as both promoter and manager, which allows him complete
control over the boxer. Because most state boxing commissions have
rules that prohibit a promoter from also serving as a boxer's manager,
92. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 28 (testimony
of Patrick C. English, Esq.) (stating that a successful boxer becomes "locked into a
continuing contract with the promoter for all the economically significant part of the
boxer's career").
93. See Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 9 (personal statement of Shelly
Finkel, boxing manager) (stating that a minimum bout obligation is essential to
prevent a boxer from being "frozen out of earning a living").
94. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 41-42
(testimony of Cedric Kushner, boxing promoter).
95. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 63 (testimony of Don
King, boxing promoter).
96. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 42 (testimony
of Cedric Kushner, boxing promoter) (stating that as long as the minimum bout
obligation is included in the contract, the promoter must continue to provide bouts
for the boxer, even if it results in financial loss to the promoter's company).
97. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
98. See Jack Newfield, Only in America: The Life and Crimes of Don King 227
(1995) (detailing how Tim Witherspoon, who was not represented by independent
management, was paid only $52,750 for a bout with Larry Holmes, while club fighter
Scott Frank, who was represented by independent management, was paid $350,000
for a bout with Holmes).
99. See supra Part I.A.
100. See Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 14, at
58 (statement of Eddy Futch, boxing trainer) (stating that "the line between the
manager and the promoter has become so dim that it is hardly visible").
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promoters often circumvent this rule by appointing a particular party
to serve as a boxer's manager. 0 1 The promoter can either dictate that
the fighter manage himself and then force him to agree to all of the
promoter's terms, 02 or can insist that a certain third party, usually an
employee or relative, be named manager. 3 The boxer has no choice
but to accept these terms, because the promoter can refuse to
promote him and thus prevent him from fighting."
Where a promoter appoints a specific manager who will agree to
accept less money for the boxer and thus himself, the boxer is often
forced to sign a contract that grants the manager 50% of each purse.Y0
This allows the promoter to increase his own profitability while
compensating the pawn manager with the fighter's money. To avoid
detection by state boxing commissions, which typically limit the
manager's compensation to 33%,1o promoters sometimes order
boxers to sign two agreements." The first contract, which is
submitted to state commissions, grants the manager 33% from each
purse, while the second contract, which is the one acted upon by the
parties, grants the manager 50% of each purse.10 ' Even more
outrageous are situations in which the promoter promotes both
participants in a bout, and is compensated not only with the
promotional fee for the fight, but also receives increased
compensation by setting up a pawn manager for each boxer. "
101. See Peter Heller, Bad Intentions: The Mike Tyson Story 217 (1989)
(discussing how Don King put his son in the boxing management business so that the
two could work hand-in-hand).
102. See Newfield, supra note 98, at 134 (discussing how Don King dictated terms
for Larry Holmes because Holmes lacked an independent manager to represent his
interests).
103. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 29 (testimony
of Patrick C. English, Esq.) (stating that "coercion to sign with a given manager would
only be because the promoter feels he can control the manager or, worse, because
there is some financial arrangement between them").
104. See Heller, supra note 101, at 218 (quoting boxer Alfonso Ratliff as saying,
"Carl [King] became my manager because Don King said the only way he would
promote me was to have his son be my manager. I didn't want anything to do with
Carl King, but I had no choice.").
105. See Newfield, supra note 98, at 209, 233, 241 (citing numerous examples of
Carl King taking 50% or more from purses of boxers that he managed and that his
father promoted).
106. See Heller, supra note 101, at 226 (stating that "in all the states where boxing
is responsibly governed ... it is illegal for a manager to receive more than thirty-three
percent").
107. See Newfield, supra note 98, at 224.
108. See id. (discussing how Don King forced former heavyweight champion Tim
Witherspoon to simultaneously sign four contracts: the first made King the exclusive
promoter, the second made King's son Carl the manager, who wvas entitled to 33% of
all of Witherspoon's earnings, the third contract was a copy of the second except that
it entitled Carl to 50% of Tim's earnings, and the fourth was completely blank,
allowing King to write in any terms he wished).
109. See Bershad & Ensor, supra note 10, at 878 (discussing a 1986 heavyweight
title bout where Don King promoted both boxers, and his son Carl was listed as
2000] 2271
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Promoters prefer to have the boxers they control fight each other,
because no matter which boxer wins, the promoter is always on the
winning side.1 ' Therefore, many times there may be a particular bout
that the public has a great interest in seeing, but because the two
fighters are promoted by different parties, the match is never made."
Other times, however, particularly in the situation in which a
champion defends his title against a challenger who is promoted by a
different party, the champion's promoter faces a big risk in the event
his fighter loses the bout.'12 Because promoters have exclusive control
over the sport with no independent organization overseeing their
actions, they have been able to institute what has now become a
common practice in order to eliminate the risk in this type of
situation."3 Here, the promoter who represents the champion agrees
to promote the fight conditioned on the challenger signing an "option
contract" that states that in the event the challenger wins the bout, he
agrees to be contractually bound to the champion's promoter for a
certain period of time."4 In order to obtain the opportunity to fight
for a championship, the challenger has no choice but to agree to the
promoter's terms.
Through the use of these coercive practices, promoters are able to
force fighters to sign contracts that provide for only minimal
obligations on the part of the promoter, and allow the promoter to
dictate the career paths of the boxers."5  Current promotional
contracts allow promoters legally to take great percentages of the
fighters' purses, often leaving the boxer with less than one-quarter of
what he was promised." 6 At all levels of the sport, promoters
manager for both boxers).
110. See Hauser, supra note 33, at 110 (quoting boxing writer Michael Katz as
saying "[f]irst, the fighter signs a promotional contract with Don King. Then the
manager signs over a piece of the boxer to Carl King. Finally, the fighter gets a title
bout. In this corner, a Don King fighter. In that corner, a Don King fighter. Guess
who wins.").
111. See Crisco, supra note 13, at 1147-48 (discussing that promoters have a
disincentive to agree to co-promote a bout because it results in the division of the
promotional profits).
112. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 54-55 (testimony of Don
King, boxing promoter) (stating that option contracts are necessary to protect the
investment a promoter makes in a boxer).
113. See Hearing on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 10 (presentation
by Fredric G. Levin) (stating that in order for an up-and-coming boxer to get an
opportunity to fight for the championship, he is usually required to sign a promotional
agreement with the champion's promoter).
114. See id. at 12 (testimony of Roy Jones, Jr., world light-heavyweight champion)
(stating that in order to get a title opportunity, it is basically mandatory to give
options to the champion's promoter).
115. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
116. See Newfield, supra note 98, at 238-41 (detailing a transaction where Tim
Witherspoon was promised $500,000 for a certain fight, but was paid only $90,095
after certain deductions were made).
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commonly make more money from each bout than do the boxers."7
A promoter is not even required to tell the boxer how much revenue
has been collected for a particular bout."8 The boxer, therefore, has
no idea how much a particular bout is worth to the promoter, or how
much the boxer is rightfully due.
Most of the state boxing commissions have rules forbidding
contractual abuses such as a promoter taking a percentage of the
boxer's purse, or insisting on a manager who is either an employee or
relative of the promoter.11 9 The commissions, however, have been
ineffective in regulating the sport and in enforcing their rules.,-" Many
state boxing commissions are run by politicians with little knowledge
of boxing, and operate on very small budgets.'2' Effective regulation
of boxing will not occur until additional measures are put into place to
ensure that the rules and regulations of the sport are strictly enforced.
Where a promoter breaches a contractual term with one of his
fighters, there is little recourse available to the boxer.2' Courts of law
have not provided an appropriate remedy because even in cases
where the boxer's claim has great merit, he will rarely pursue an
actual trial because litigation would entail putting his career on hold
for several years.1" Although thousands of boxers have filed lawsuits
against their promoters, most are either settled, quickly dismissed, or
disappear for lack of funding. 24
A recent illustration of the inability of courts to effectively address
boxers' claims is the dispute between promoter Don King and
welterweight champion Felix Trinidad."z On June 11, 1994, Trinidad
117. See Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 8 (testimony of Shelly Finkel,
boxing manager) ("Even at the very lofty peaks of the sport I have seen instances
where a promoter makes significantly more money, sometimes multiples more, [than]
the star attraction whom the promoter has under contract.").
118. See Fordham Sports Law Symposium Transcript, supra note 17, at 74-75
(statement of Louis DiBella, Senior Vice President, HBO Sports) (stating that boxers
have no idea about what their services generate in terms of economics).
119. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
120. See A Blueprint for Boxing Reform, supra note 41, at 14 (stating that the New
York State Athletic Commission "has failed to apply restrictions on judicial licensing
and appointment which are already mandated by existing law").
121. See Fordham Sports Law Symposium Transcript, supra note 17, at 12
(statement of Louis DiBella, Senior Vice President, HBO Sports) ("Most state
athletic commissions are dominated by political hacks and generally have no budget.
When you have no budget, you cannot effectively do anything.").
122. See infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
123. See Michael Katz, No One Fighting Over This Award, N.Y. Daily News, Nov.
25, 1998, at 95 (stating that Felix Trinidad's legal problem with promoter Don King
"makes him front-runner for non-fighter of 1999").
124. See Newfield, supra note 98, at 247, (noting that there had been over 100
lawsuits filed against promoter Don King between 1978 and 1995. Of those lawsuits,
two were settled and the rest simply disappeared because there was no money to
sustain them).
125. See Trinidad v. King, No. 98 CIV. 4518, 1998 WL 823653, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
24, 1998).
2000] 2273
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
signed an exclusive promotional agreement with King for a term of
four years, which also included the standard term that the contract
would automatically extend if Trinidad was ever recognized as world
champion.12 6 At the time the promotional agreement was executed,
Trinidad was already recognized as the IBF world welterweight
champion. 27 At the end of the four-year period, the parties disagreed
as to whether the contract had been fully performed. Trinidad
claimed that the four-year period had elapsed, while King claimed
that he had exclusive rights for Trinidad's entire title reign plus two
additional years." Trinidad argued that a standard contractual
principal requires that ambiguous contractual terms be interpreted
against the interest of the party that drafted them.2 9 The court denied
Trinidad's motion for a preliminary injunction to allow him to
contract with another promoter, stating he had not shown a likelihood
of success on the merits, although he had presented questions of fact
sufficient to continue the litigation. 130 Not wanting to waste the prime
of his career fighting in court, Trinidad agreed to continue under his
agreement with King so that he could get back into the ring.'3 '
The courts have also offered little help to boxers because often their
preference is not to void contracts no matter how one-sided the terms
may be.132  For example, in a 1990 lawsuit between heavyweight
champion James Douglas and Don King, Douglas argued that his
promotional contract should be declared void because King was in
such control of the promotion of heavyweight title fights that Douglas
had no choice but to sign an agreement that included any terms King
desired.133  The court dismissed the unconscionability argument,
stating that Douglas had not made the required showing of unfair
bargaining process because he had not alleged that deceptive or high-
pressure tactics were used.13' The court further stated that "[w]ithout
some definite allegation of a defect in the contract negotiation process
apart from King's stature in the boxing field, which alone does not
suggest 'inequality so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience
and confound the judgment,"' Douglas's allegations could not support
a claim of unconscionability.' 35 What the court failed to realize, or to
admit, is that powerful promoters do not have to use pressure tactics
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at *9.
130. See id. at *10.
131. See Trinidad Signs Contract for $42.9M With King, Times Union (Albany),
Dec. 1, 1998, at C2 (discussing a four-year contract between Don King and Felix
Trinidad negotiated less than a week after Trinidad's motion for a preliminary
injunction was denied).
132. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
133. See Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 778,780 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 781 (quoting Christian v. Christian, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823 (1977)).
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to force boxers into one-sided contractual arrangements, because their
control is so complete that they are able to offer promotional
agreements on a "take it or leave it" basis.
B. Rankings and Judge Selection and Compensation Abuses
The United States Supreme Court once noted that the most
lucrative asset in professional boxing is the designation "world
champion" in the division in which the boxer competes."" The Court
acknowledged that such a title affords the boxer financial returns from
personal appearances, endorsements, and other activities, and entitles
him to a greater percentage of money from future bouts.' -' The Court
further stated that the promotion of championship boxing matches is a
more lucrative business than the promotion of non-championship
matches. 138  A boxer's high ranking can thus be considered a
"property right," because with it comes great financial rewards"39
One of the main reasons that promoters wield so much control over
the sport is their ability to manipulate the rankings. Rankings are
determined by the various sanctioning organizations, the three most
important of which are the IBF, WBA, and WBC.'" Although
rankings in boxing involve subjective criteria, such as quality of
opposition, 141 both the general public and boxing insiders believe that
the rankings calculated by the various sanctioning organizations can
only be explained as gifts to their favorite promoters.42 The
sanctioning organizations today run the sport in a similar fashion to
the way that organized crime controlled boxing in the 1950s; each
group is able to exclude boxers who refuse to be obligated to
"connected" parties. 143 Promoters openly admit that they share deep
136. See United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236. 244-46 (1955)
(holding that championship boxing matches constitute a separate relevant market for
antitrust purposes because of the unique financial opportunities that they provide).
137. See id. at 246.
138. See id
139. See Duva v. World Boxing Ass'n, 548 F. Supp. 710, 718-20 (D.N.J. 1982)
(holding that the third-ranked junior middleweight contender had a protectible
property interest in his ranking because it guaranteed him a title opportunity due to
his status as the leading available contender); see also Hearings on the Ali Act, supra
note 48, at 7 (statement of Sen. John McCain) (stating that a high ranking is a
property right because of the influence it exerts over the boxer's career).
140. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
142. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 101-02 (testimony of
Steve Farhood, boxing writer) (discussing how fighters are elevated in the rankings
when they are associated with certain promoters); see also Hearings on the Ali Act,
supra note 48, at 8 (statement of Shelly Finkel, boxing manager) ("The only
conceivable explanation for many of these unreasonable actions [of sanctioning
organizations] is that they consistently strengthen a particular promoter's stranglehold
over a division or divisions within the sport.").
143. See Jake LaMotta, Raging Bull: My Story 121, 139 (1970) (describing how
Jake LaMotta remained the number one middleweight contender for four years
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friendships with some of the executive officials in the sanctioning
organizations, 144 and also that on occasion they have bribed officials to
secure a certain ranking or bout for one of their boxers. 45 The ability
to manipulate ratings is very important because it grants a promoter
greater opportunity to promote big money bouts. The influence over
rankings has also corrupted the very core of the sport, because
frequently title opportunities are given not to those who have earned
them, but rather to a boxer who fits a particular purpose for a
promoter. 46
The influence that promoters can exert with the backing of a
sanctioning body can be illustrated through several examples. A
recent instance is the subject of a current lawsuit between Cedric
Kushner and rival promoter Don King for tortious interference with
contract and fraud. 147 In that case, a boxer promoted by Kushner
testified that King gave him a check for $125,000 in exchange for the
boxer's agreement not to participate in a particular bout, and to
instead sign a promotional agreement with King.148 The boxer further
testified that King told him that he would never be the number one
contender unless King was his promoter.1 49  Another example of
promoter influence over rankings led to the filing of a lawsuit that
became the starting point for an FBI investigation resulting in the
indictment of IBF officials. 5 ' In that case, number one heavyweight
contender, Michael Moorer, brought a lawsuit against IBF officials
alleging that the officials had accepted bribes to drop Moorer in the
rankings and replace him with Francois Botha, a King-promoted
without receiving a title opportunity because he refused to cooperate with the
organized crime figures who ran the sport); infra note 156 and accompanying text; see
also Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 725, 750 (9th Cir. 1963) (upholding the
convictions of underworld figures John Carbo and Frank Palermo for extortion and
interstate transmissions of threats to secure managerial control of a professional
boxer).
144. See Hauser, supra note 33, at 99-100 (reporting that promoter Don King and
WBC President Jose Suliaman openly acknowledge their close friendship).
145. See Heller, supra note 101, at 140 (discussing how promoter Bob Arum paid
WBA officials $85,000 in order to get a title opportunity for one of his fighters).
146. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 81 (testimony of Louis
DiBella, Senior Vice President, HBO Sports) (stating that there is no equity in the
fact that Richard Frazier was ranked number one contender and given a title
opportunity, and that this was a result of corruption of the system); see also Kondrath
v. Arum, 881 F. Supp. 925, 928 (D. Del. 1995) (stating that a boxer who was selected
as an opponent whom the promoter's champion could defeat, became eligible to
participate in the bout by writing a letter to the IBF requesting to be ranked in the
organization's top ten for that weight division).
147. See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, No. 98 Civ. 6859, 1999 WL
771366, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1999).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See David Wharton, Top IBF Officials to Face Charges, L.A. Times, Nov. 5.
1999, at Dl.
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fighter.' 5' Before the change in the ratings was made official, King
had called officers of HBO and "predicted" that Botha would be the
number-one-rated contender when the new rankings were released,
despite having never beaten a top-10 contender.'-
On November 4, 1999, the U.S. Attorney's office in Newark, New
Jersey, indicted three top officials of the IBF for taking bribes and
fixing rankings. 53 Culminating from a two-year investigation by the
FBI, the indictment alleges that the officials received illegal payments
from managers and promoters to manipulate the ratings system for
the benefit of particular boxers."5 In a sworn affidavit to the court,
the IBF Rankings Chairman declared that IBF rankings were
enhanced by payoffs from certain promoters and managers who
regularly paid IBF officials to rank their fighters in certain positions.' 55
The payments not only guaranteed preferential treatment for the
promoter's fighter, but also worked to punish boxers who left these
various promoters by immediately lowering their rankings.'L In fact,
the payments allowed certain promoters to dictate the order of the
rankings in ways that even the IBF officials felt were unfair and
ridiculous." T Although these allegations have yet to be adjudicated,
they seem to finally insert into public record what most boxing
insiders label "common knowledge. " "
In addition to the receipt of direct payments, sanctioning
organizations also manipulate the ratings in order to increase the
organization's profits. Because sanctioning organizations are
compensated by receiving a certain percentage of the two fighters'
purses, 5 9 an incentive exists to rank more highly the most popular
boxers, who earn larger purses, so that the organization is also paid
more money.56 The motive to inflate the rankings of popular boxers
151. See John Reid, Ring Rage: Courts are Taking on Rankings Corrtption, Times-
Picayune (New Orleans), June 3, 1999, at Dl.
152- See id
153. See Wharton, supra note 150.
154. See id.
155. See IBF Court Documents Unsealed, Associated Press Online, Jan. 29. 2000,
available in 2000 WL 9752467.
156. See David Wharton, Deck Stacked Against Lee, L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 2000, at
D1.
157. See Robert Rudolph, Tape Shows Boxing Officials Counting "'Christnas
Cheer"--Judge Releases FBI Video in Corruption Case, The Star-Ledger, Feb. 3.2000,
at I (stating that IBF President Robert Lee became "frustrated when he [was] forced
to include fighters he derides as 'no-fight' bums in his listings simply because they are
backed by King").
158. See Norm Frauenheim, More Than Title at Stake for Boxing: Uncle San to
Take a Swing, Too, The Arizona Republic, Nov. 12, 1999, at Cl.
159. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18. at 10
(presentation by Frederic G. Levin) (detailing the sanctioning fee process, which
includes the taking of 3% of each fighter's purse).
160. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 77 (testimony of Louis
DiBella, Senior Vice President, HBO Sports) (stating that because sanctioning fees
are based upon a percentage of the fighters' purses, the sanctioning organizations
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explains events such as how Mike Tyson, the boxer who has received
some of the largest purses in history,161 was declared the number one
contender immediately upon his release from a three-year prison
term.1 62
The public is also victimized by the manipulation of the rankings
process because often the high ranking of undeserving boxers leads to
lower-quality bouts. 63  In addition to purposeful manipulation,
sanctioning organizations also refuse to rank champions recognized by
other organizations, or boxers who have attempted to win the
championship of another organization."6 The refusal to rank other
top fighters in each division, and the desire to protect a paying
promoter's boxer, often lead to mismatches in championship bouts,
especially those involving mandatory challengers.6
As is the case with contractual abuses, the abuse of the rankings
system is permitted to occur because there is no independent
governing organization in boxing, and thus no monitor of the rankings
process.' 66 Boxing rankings consider many subjective elements, and
can therefore vary greatly depending on differences of opinion.
Certain promoters, managers, and sanctioning organization officials
have taken advantage of this fact and have conspired to manipulate
the rankings in their favor. The ability to manipulate the rankings in
boxing allows unethical parties to force boxers to accept their terms
and fees, because the boxers know that if they do not cooperate, they
will be prevented from achieving their professional goals. The
manipulation of the rankings also adversely effects the public, because
often, an undeserving boxer is given a title opportunity that results in
a mismatch. Thus, the manipulation of rankings leads to lower-quality
bouts and destroys the credibility of the sport.
The judge selection and compensation process is manipulated for
the same reasons as the rankings process-the parties with a financial
interest in the outcome of a bout decide who will officiate the bout,
and exercise influence over those officials. Under the current
"have an incentive to have the most popular champions and the champions bringing
in the most economic benefit").
161. See, e.g., Mike Tyson Files $100 Million Lawsuit Against "Pal" Don King,
supra note 1 (stating that Tyson had earned approximately $140 million in his first six
fights after being released from prison in 1995).
162. See Lewis v. World Boxing Council, 914 F. Supp. 1121, 1122-23 (D.N.J. 1996).
163. See A Bheprint For Boxing Reform, supra note 41, at 11 (discussing several
instances when a fighter unjustifiably receives a high ranking by facing weak
competition, and later is easily defeated by the champion).
164. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 78-79 (testimony of
Louis DiBella, Senior Vice President, HBO Sports).
165. See id. at 79 ("The worst prize fights that [HBO has] televised over the last
decade, and certainly over the last five years, have been mandated fights involving
number one ranked contenders.").
166. See supra Part I.B.
167. See supra Part I.A.
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system, promoters and sanctioning organization officials thus have too
great an opportunity to influence the decisions of the judges. t
Judges for championship bouts are typically designated by the
sanctioning organization, and these choices are rarely challenged by
the state boxing commission. 69 Sanctioning organizations, therefore,
often choose an official who does not have sufficient experience, or
can be easily influenced, to judge a major bout, and whose decision
can lead to great controversy. 70  Because judges are currently
compensated directly by the promoter, who pays for the officials to
travel around the world, stay in luxury hotels, and receive between
$1,000-$8,000 to officiate the bout,71 judges are more likely to favor
the promoter's fighter out of a sense of gratitude. Also, because no
one other than the promoter and the judge are involved with the
reimbursement of travel and lodging expenses, "a judge could quite
conceivably submit an expense voucher for $100 to a promoter-and
receive a check for $10,000 in return." The ability to manipulate the
outcome of bouts is another factor that places boxers at the mercy of
their promoters. 173
Critics have amply demonstrated that boxers are subjected to a
variety of abuses due to their lack of leverage or bargaining power
when dealing with promoters, managers, and sanctioning organization
officials. Because the current system in boxing is rampant with
corruption, these parties control all of the elements that are
necessities to a boxer's success, including the availability of bouts, a
boxer's numerical ranking, and judge selection for each of the boxer's
matches. Therefore, in order for a boxer to continue to advance in his
profession and move closer to his goal of obtaining a world
championship, he has no choice but to accept the contractual terms
168. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 78 (testimony of Louis
DiBella, Senior Vice President, HBO Sports) (stating that the current rules permit a
promoter to pay for the entertainment of judges).
169. See A Blueprint For Boxing Reform, supra note 41, at 14 (discussing situations
when state commissions have approved judges who are either unqualified or
unlicensed).
170. On March 13, 1999, Evander Holyfield and Lennox Lewis fought for the world
heavyweight championship. Though most observers felt that Lewis had clearly won
the bout, the IBF judge, Eugenia Williams, scored the bout in favor of Holyfield. See
id. The selection of Williams by the IBF was heavily criticized, even by officials of the
other sanctioning organizations. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54,
at 35-36 (testimony of Jose Suliaman, President, WBC) (stating that he was opposed
to the selection of Williams because a more experienced and neutral judge was
needed for the bout).
171. See Bill Brubaker, Boxing Referees: Have Connections, Will Travel. Wash.
Post, Oct. 3, 1993, at DI.
172 Hearings on Revision of Boxing Regulation, supra note 20 (statement of
Wallace Matthews, boxing writer).
173. See Newfield, supra note 98, at 232 (discussing how Don King threatened that
he would make sure that Tim Witherspoon lost a decision as long as his opponent was
not knocked out, because Witherspoon had sought the aid of an attorney to negotiate
a contract with King).
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and fees dictated by promoters, managers, and sanctioning
organization officials. The next part addresses specific provisions of
the Ali Act that are designed to eliminate these abuses.
III. THE MUHAMMAD ALl BOXING REFORM ACT
In an effort to prevent the exploitation of boxers, Senator McCain
has sponsored the Ali Act to establish uniform standards for business
practices in the boxing industry.174 Although a final vote on the Ali
Act was blocked by two Democratic Senators in 1999,175 Senator
McCain is currently making passage of the Act a top priority for the
year 2000.176 This part discusses the background of the Ali Act by
examining past legislative efforts by Congress to regulate the boxing
industry. It then discusses specific provisions of the Ali Act aimed at
remedying contractual abuses and manipulation of the rankings and
judge selection processes. Finally, this part discusses the remedies
provided for in the Ali Act that seek to deter these exploitative
practices.
A. Background of the Ali Act
Professional boxing has been the subject of congressional hearings
and investigations for several decades. In the early 1960s, Senator
Estes Kefauver conducted a four-year investigation into boxing that
resulted in several legislative proposals. 77 The goal of these proposals
was the formation of a national commission that would be responsible
for the regulation of contracts, medical procedures, and data
collection on boxers. 78 Before this legislation could be voted on,
however, Senator Kefauver died, and the bill was never enacted.179
Congress again conducted hearings throughout the 1970s, which
resulted in the proposal of a bill that would have established a federal
boxing committee responsible for investigating impropriety in boxing
and establishing minimum standards of compensation for boxers.'
The bill did not receive wide support, however, and was never
enacted. 81
Legislative efforts aimed at professional boxing continued during
the 1980s, resulting in several proposals."S In 1983, three separate
174. See H.R. 1832, 106th Cong. § 2(6) (1999).
175. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
176. See McCain Disappointed Boxing Reform Didn't Pass This Year, supra note
17.
177. See Millspaugh, supra note 10, at 33-34.
178. See Jonathan S. McElroy, Current and Proposed Federal Regulation of
Professional Boxing, 9 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 463, 470 (1999).
179. See id.
180. See Millspaugh, supra note 10, at 50.
181. See id.
182. See McElroy, supra note 178, at 471-72.
2280 [Vol. 68
MUHAMMAD ALl BOXING REFORM ACT
bills were introduced; two focused on providing guidelines for
rankings and health procedures in boxing, while the third sought to
create a national commission to oversee compensation, working
conditions, and the safety of equipment and facilities in the sport.1
Again, these three proposals were not enacted due to insufficient
support. 184 Several other legislative proposals were initiated during
the early 1990s, but as with their predecessors, the proposals never
became law.ts5  Most of the 1990s initiatives focused on the
establishment of a national commission or organization to set forth
industry standards, the regulation of medical procedures, and the
establishment of rules for contractual agreements between boxers and
promoters.186 The committees assigned to review these proposals
acted upon none of the bills."8
The first piece of legislation that Congress did succeed in enacting was the
Professional Boxers Safety Act of 19 96 ,ss which regulates the health and safety
standards of professional boxing to avoid unnecessary injury inside the ring."
The Ali Act, first proposed by Senator McCain in June 1998," is a proposed
addition to that legislation, and takes the regulation of boxing a step further by
protecting boxers outside of the ring from exploitation through unethical
business practices."' Two versions of the Ali Act were passed by the Senate,
and one was passed by the House of Representatives, but a vote on the final
draft of the bill was blocked by two Democratic Senators." One of these
Senators was Harry Reid of Nevada, who has previously stated that boxing's
two most powerful promoters, Don King and Bob Arum, are his most
important constituents 93 Although neither Don King nor Bob Arum
accepted the invitation to testify on the passage of the Ali Act, promoters
would be adversely effected by any regulation of the sport, and thus are
generally against the bill's passage.194
183. See id
184. See id
185. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 194-98.
186. See iL
187. See id
188. See Pub. L. 104-272, 110 Stat. 3309-13 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313
(Supp. IV 1998)).
189. These provisions include the requirement of a pre-fight physical examination,
the registration with the state boxing commission, and the establishment of
suspension procedures for medical and disciplinary reasons. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6304-06.
190. See S. 2238,105th Cong. (1998).
191. See H.R. 1832, 106th Cong. § 3(1) (1999).
192. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
194. See Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 8 (statement of Sen. John
McCain).
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B. Provisions of the Ali Act Designed to Eliminate Contractual
Abuses
Initial drafts of the Ali Act provided for specific mandatory
provisions that must appear in every contract between a boxer and a
promoter or manager.195 These requirements established mutual
obligations between the parties, including the specification of a
minimum number of bouts in which the boxer must participate each
year, and a certain period of time for which the contract would be in
effect. 196 The latest draft of the Ali Act, however, has eliminated
these provisions in favor of another, which allows the ABC, a non-
profit organization comprised of all state boxing commissions,' 97 two
years in which to develop minimum contractual standards for all
boxing contracts. 198 Although the state boxing commissions currently
regulate boxing contracts in certain respects, these rules are very
rarely followed or enforced. 99  The standards to be established
pursuant to the Ali Act will address the duration term of contracts,
the obligations of the parties, and any other terms that the ABC feels
should be specifically included or prohibited in boxing contracts.
These provisions will attempt to remedy abuses resulting from
inequitable contracts, which often include: the exclusion of a
minimum bout term, which can prevent a boxer from earning a
living;' the use of a term to automatically extend the duration of a
contract if the fighter ever becomes world champion, which ties the
fighter to the promoter for the most successful part of the boxer's
career;20' and the use of unfair terms that result from negotiations
where the manager is not serving the boxer's best interests.2"
Currently, the promoter of a champion often forces challengers to
sign an option contract that grants the promoter exclusive
promotional rights to the challenger in the event that he defeats the
champion.2 3 The Ali Act specifically addresses option contracts by
limiting them to a 12-month duration. °" In addition, promoters would
be prohibited from using boxers whom they had obtained rights to
through an option contract as leverage to obtain additional options on
other boxers.2 5  Further, promoters would be prohibited from
195. See S. 305, 106th Cong. § 15(a) (1999).
196. See id. § 15(a)(1).
197. See Hearings on Revision of Boxing Regulation, supra note 20 (testimony of
Gregory P. Sirb, President, ABC).
198. See H.R. 1832, 106th Cong. § 9 (1999).
199. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 93.
201. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
204. See H.R. 1832, 106th Cong. § 10 (1999).
205. See id. § 10(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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obtaining option contracts as a condition precedent to a bout that is
mandatory under the rules of the sanctioning organizations2
Throughout the hearings on the Ali Act, promoters argued that
option contracts should be allowed as compensation for the
opportunity being provided to the challenger by the champion's
promoter.2 7 Promoters advocated for option contracts on three to
four title defenses should the challenger win, and for distribution of
the revenues from those fights among both promoters so that all
parties are compensated.m Congress compromised with the
promoters by allowing the use of option contracts, but limiting the
term of these contracts to one year. The limitation of option contracts
to one year will allow promoters to recoup some of the loss in the
event their champion loses, but will prevent a promoter from
controlling a particular division by locking up successive champions2
The provisions limiting the use of option contracts should also act to
reduce some of the negotiating power of promoters.
In a further attempt to equalize negotiations between boxers and
promoters, the Ali Act contains a provision forbidding both a
promoter from having any interest in the management of the boxer,
and a manager from having an interest in the promotion of the
boxer.210 Under the current system in boxing, many of the most
powerful promoters force boxers to hire a particular manager, usually
an employee or family member of the promoter, whose loyalty is to
the promoter and not to the boxer, thus compromising the boxer's
interests during negotiations with the promoter. Under the Ali Act,
a manager could not be an employee of the promoter, and could not
receive any compensation from the promoter outside of the
agreement with the boxer to take a certain percentage of each of the
boxer's purses.1  Separating the roles of manager and promoter will
prevent conflicts of interests, ensure that negotiations actually take
place with a responsible party bargaining for the boxer's best interests,
and prevent situations where promoters set up a company for a
relative who then handles the management functions for the fighters
by simply following the orders of the promoter.213
206. See id § 10(b).
207. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 42 (testimony
of Cedric Kushner, boxing promoter).
208. See id.
209. See id. (arguing that an equitable solution would be to give the champion's
promoter options on three or four bouts, and if after that time the boxer was still
champion, he would return to his original promoter).
210. See H.R. 1832 § 5.
211. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
212- See H.R. 1832 § 5.
213. See Owen Slot, Boxing: Mystery of Don King and the Shrinking S1 Million
Purse, Daily Telegraph (London), April 12, 1998, at 7 (describing how some boxers
have been forced to sign Monarch Sports as managers, a company owned by Don
King's son and daughter); see also Newfield, supra note 98, at 224 (discussing a
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Under the Ali Act, promoters would also be required to make
several disclosures to state boxing commissions that would act to
protect boxers from exploitation after the bout has taken place. 14
Currently, promoters are only required to submit a Commission Bout
Contract that states the base purse for the boxers, but often bears no
relation to the actual terms of the deal between the promoter and the
boxers.215 Under the Ali Act, the promoter would have to disclose to
the state commission a copy of the promotional contract with either or
both fighters competing in the bout.216 Another provision would
require the promoter to submit a statement, made under the penalty
of perjury, that the agreement submitted to the commission is the only
one that exists between the boxer and the promoter.1 7 Ensuring that
only one agreement exists will prevent situations in which a promoter
forces a boxer to simultaneously sign two agreements with slightly
different terms.218 Under the Ali Act, the promoter would also have
to disclose any fees, charges, and expenses that he will assess a boxer
for the particular bout.2 19 Finally, the legislation would require the
promoter to disclose any payment or benefit being made to a
sanctioning organization, and any reduction in a boxer's purse that is
contrary to their original agreement. 22o Payment disclosures will
prevent situations in which the boxer is promised a certain purse, but
is given less than was promised after the bout takes place. 2'
The promoter would also be required under the Ali Act to make
disclosures directly to the boxer that he promotes. The strongest
requirement mandates that the promoter disclose the exact amount of
compensation that the promoter will receive as a result of a particular
bout.222 Currently, promoters often make a great deal more money
than do the star attractions of the events they promote.123 This
undoubtedly results from the fact that boxers are ignorant of the value
of a particular bout to the promoter. The disclosure of the total
revenue a promoter has amassed for a particular bout is an important
provision because it removes a significant portion of the promoter's
power during future negotiations by allowing the boxer to know
exactly how much a bout is worth to the promoter, thus enabling a
boxer to negotiate larger purses for himself. Dissenters of the bill
deposition where King admitted that he pays his son Carl, proving that he could not
be an independent negotiator).
214. See H.R. 1832 § 13.
215. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 28 (testimony
of Patrick C. English, Esq.).
216. See H.R. 1832 § 13(a)(1).
217. See id. § 13(a)(2).
218. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
219. See H.R. 1832 § 13(a)(3)(A).
220. See id. § 13(a)(3)(B)-(C).
221. See Newfield, supra note 98, at 227.
222. See H.R. 1832 § 13(b)(1).
223. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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argue that this information should not have to be shared because a
boxer and promoter have directly adverse interests during
negotiations. 4 They reason that because the boxer is not the party
taking the financial risk for the promotion of a bout, he should not be
entitled to this information.' Further, they argue, the disclosure is
misleading because a boxer may assume that the promoter is keeping
all of the revenue, while in actuality the boxers' purses, fees, and
expenses from the bout, along with company overhead, must be
subtracted before determination of the promoter's profit or loss. 6
But surely, these concepts can all be explained to a boxer, who can
then use this information to determine the compensation that each
party is receiving from the bout.
Finally, the Ali Act provides that promoters would also have to
disclose to the boxer all fees and charges that will be assessed, and any
increase that is contrary to their previous agreement. -'  The
disclosure of increased charges will prevent a promoter from
arbitrarily reducing the boxer's compensation, through the creation of
a clear written record as to the obligations of the parties and reasons
for alterations of these obligations.' In addition, promoters may be
required to submit all of the information that they disclose to boxers
and state commissions to the state attorney general upon that officer's
request.229 In sum, the disclosure provisions should act to replace the
back room dealings that currently dominate boxing negotiations with
more open and equitable transactions. By establishing requirements
that the promoter disclose truthful documents to the state
commissions and boxers, and by enforcing these provisions through
law enforcement personnel, promoters will be deterred from altering
their obligations to a boxer, and disputes will be resolved more
quickly because the documents and disclosure provisions will establish
a paper trail.
C. Provisions of the Ali Act Designed to Eliminate Ranking and
Judge Selection and Compensation Abuses
In addition to contractual abuses, the Ali Act also addresses
ranking abuses. Currently, rankings are arbitrarily designated and
altered, often promoting the financial interests of boxing's most
powerful promoters, who have been accused of bribing sanctioning
organization officials in order to secure a particular ranking for their
boxer. 3  Recognizing that the sanctioning bodies represent major
224. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-449(I), at 27-29 (1999).
225. See id at 28.
226. See id.
227. See H.R. 1832 § 13(b)(2).
228. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
229. See H.R. 1832 § 13(c).
230. See supra Part II.B.
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power bases in the sport, many of the provisions in the final draft of
the Ali Act are aimed at regulating such organizations."3
First, Congress would give the ABC two years from the enactment
of the All Act to establish guidelines for objective and written criteria
for the rating of professional boxers, which each sanctioning body
would be required to follow. 2  Earlier drafts of the Ali Act had
allowed the sanctioning organizations themselves to determine the
objective criteria for ratings. 3 No doubt out of a recognition that the
organizations already have written criteria that are ineffective, the Ali
Act has mandated that the ABC create additional criteria in an effort
to make boxing rankings more objective.2 The sanctioning
organizations would also be required to implement an appeals process
under which they would provide a written explanation of a particular
fighter's ranking following a request by that fighter. 5 In addition, the
Ali Act requires that in the event of a change in the ratings of the top
ten fighters in any division, the organization must post the ratings
change and a written explanation of the change either on its Internet
website or through submission directly to the state boxing
commissions.26
Though the rankings of boxers are subjective by nature, depending
upon how judges view a particular match and the merits of a fighter's
performance, written criteria will prevent sanctioning organizations
from retaining complete discretion. For example, if the ABC
determines that a boxer cannot be rated in the top ten until he defeats
a rated contender, the organizations will no longer be able to provide
gift rankings to their favorite promoters.237 The necessity of providing
a written explanation for a change in the ratings will also discourage
changes without merit because the organizations will not be able to
justify them. In effect, these provisions will be the first step toward
making the ratings more of a mathematical calculation, similar to that
used to rank teams in college football."3
In an effort to terminate the practice of promoters and managers
paying to have their boxer ranked in a certain spot, the bill forbids
outright any officer or employee of a sanctioning body from receiving
231. See H.R. 1832 § 11.
232. See id. § 11(a).
233. See S. 305, 106th Cong. § 16(a) (1999).
234. An example of a provision that could make boxing rankings more objective is
one which states that a boxer cannot be ranked in the top ten until he defeats a boxer
who is already ranked in the top ten. Such a provision would guarantee that a top
contender has defeated at least one credible opponent.
235. See H.R. 1832 § 11(b).
236. See id. § 11(c).
237. See Jack Newfield, Feds Have King Boxed into a Corner: Indictment Looms
for Ratings Fix, N.Y. Post, June 18, 1999, at 2 (describing how federal prosecutors
have documented evidence that certain boxers have automatically been moved up in
the ratings after signing with a major promoter).
238. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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any compensation, gift, or benefit from any promoter, manager, or
boxer.29 Although some critics argue that this section is unnecessary
because bribery is already illegal, the provision will enable authorities
to more easily prove acts of bribery because they will not have to
prove that the gift was given with the intent to manipulate. "- 0 The
provisions directed at remedying the rankings process are all designed
to make the process more objective, and therefore less susceptible to
individual manipulation. The creation of written records and
explanations will deter sanctioning organizations from manipulating
the rankings in ways that are inconsistent with their previously
expressed statements.
In addition to contractual and ranking abuses, the Ali Act also
addresses the corruption of boxing judges. In an attempt to prevent
judges from being influenced or manipulated by an interested party,
the Ali Act includes certain provisions for bout officials.2'" Under the
current system, sanctioning organizations usually select the judges for
championship bouts, and there are no standardized rates for the
entertainment, travel, and hotel accommodations for judges." z
Promoters are responsible for the compensation and expenses of
judges, and thus often provide lavish treatment for judges in an
attempt to influence the outcome of a bout. 43 The Ali Act addresses
these issues through several of its provisions. First, it states that no
match can proceed until the judges have been approved by the state
commission that is in charge of regulating the particular bout! 4
Requiring approval by the state commission will prevent situations
where a sanctioning organization approves a judge for a bout whom
the commission does not feel is sufficiently experienced to judge the
bout, or is obviously partial to a particular promoter. In addition,
judges are required to disclose to the state commission a statement of
the entire consideration that they are to receive for their participation
in the match.24 That way, if allegations of corruption ensue, the
commission can investigate whether the official was given anything
239. See H.R. 1832 § 5(2)(c)(2).
240. The language of the provision provides that "no officer or employee of a
sanctioning organization may receive any compensation, gift, or benefit, directly or
indirectly, from a promoter, boxer, or manager." Id. Compare this provision with the
language of a typical sports bribery statute: "A person is guilty of sports bribing when
he... [c]onfers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon a sports official with
intent to influence him to perform his duties improperly[.]" N.Y. Penal Law § 180A0
(McKinney 1999) (emphasis added).
241. See H.R. 1832 §§ 14, 16.
242. See Fordham Sports Law Symposium Transcript, supra note 17, at 90
(statement of Louis DiBella, Senior Vice President, HBO Sports).
243. See id (stating that a promoter can put a judge in either the Four Seasons or
Motel 6, and that under the current system, providing lavish accommodations is
completely legal).
244. See H.R. 1832 § 16.
245. See i&. § 14.
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beyond what is common practice. The Ali Act falls short of
completely remedying the manipulation of judges, however, because it
fails to alter the practice of direct payment from the promoter to the
judges.246 Though the disclosure provisions therefore may not solve
all problems in judging, and there is no guarantee that all information
submitted will be accurate, they will establish an evidentiary trail that
can lead to harsh penalties if the process is abused.
D. Remedies
The Ali Act is not a soft piece of legislation that can be easily
ignored; instead, it provides substantial remedies for those who are
exploited and punishments for those who do not follow its
21provisions. 4 Any contractual provision that is in violation of the Ali
Act is deemed a "restraint of trade, contrary to public policy, and
unenforceable. '' 248 Thus, if a promoter attempts to exploit a boxer
through means prohibited by the Ali Act, the contract would be
deemed unenforceable and the boxer would no longer be bound to
that promoter. The promoters would therefore be prevented from
using the courts to enforce their one-sided agreements. 249 The Ali Act
also grants a private right of action to any boxer who is economically
injured by a violation of any provision, and specifically states that
damages, court costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees can be
recovered.10 The boxer is not the only party who is authorized to
bring a civil suit in the event that violations occur. The Ali Act also
permits a state attorney general to bring suit on behalf of its residents
whenever there is reason to believe that a person is engaging in
practices that violate any provision of the Act."' Even more powerful
than the authorization of civil lawsuits is the imposition of fines and
criminal penalties for any person who knowingly violates specific
provisions of the Ali Act. 2  Upon conviction, a defendant can be
fined up to $100,000, and in some cases even greater penalties attach if
the violation occurs in connection with a bout that produces gross
revenues of over $2 million. 3  Further, the defendant can be
sentenced to a prison term of up to 1 year.' The imposition of these
criminal penalties for contract violations should serve as a major
deterrent to violations of the Act.
The provisions of the Ali Act provide a substantial first step toward
246. See infra Part IV.B.
247. See H.R. 1832 §§ 6, 10.
248. See id. § 10(a)(1)(A).
249. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (providing an example of a one-
sided contract favoring the promoter).
250. See H.R. 1832 § 6(d).
251. See id. § 6(c).
252. See id. § 6(b).
253. See id. § 6(a)-(b).
254. See id. § 6.
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eventually eliminating the exploitation of professional boxers. The
Ali Act will not remedy all of the problems that currently plague
boxing, but will effectively deter some of the most blatant abuses that
occur in the areas of contractual terms, rankings, and judge selection
and compensation. The next part argues that although federal
legislation through the Ali Act is a necessary interim measure in
beginning the reformation process in boxing, the industry should
ultimately be regulated by independent private organizations.
IV. THE FUTURE OF BOXING
The boxing industry has been riddled with abuses over the past
century, resulting in inequitable contracts and corrupt processes for
rankings determination and judge selection and compensation. 55
What remains clear is that the current system must be changed in
order to establish clear, unified standards that all parties must obey.
While the All Act provides a strong blueprint for change, the ultimate
solution is private regulation. This part discusses why the Ali Act is a
necessary first step toward achieving uniform regulation in boxing,
and dissects the arguments against federal legislation. It then
proposes other protections that should be incorporated into the Ali
Act or future legislation to further protect against the exploitation of
boxers. Finally, this part describes why the best long-term solution is
private regulation of the sport by an independent organization.
A. The Ali Act Is A Necessary Starting Point
The exploitation of boxers and rigged rankings and matches have
existed in the sport of boxing for many decades, and have frequently
resulted in hearings and investigations by government committees. 6
These investigations led to several attempts at federal legislation, all
unsuccessful' save for the Professional Boxers Safety Act of 1996.3s
The passage of this federal law, the numerous hearings on boxing held
by other governmental authorities, the indictment of IBF officials, and
the proposal of the Ali Act have all demonstrated the corruption
pervasive in the sport and a present interest in establishing some form
of regulation.
This popular support for change is not without its detractors,
however. Several of the arguments against enacting the Ali Act
revolve around the central notion that by adopting federal regulation,
255. See supra Part II.
256. See supra Part III.A.
257. For a discussion of the past legislation that was proposed but never enacted,
see Anderson, supra note 11, at 194-204; Howard, supra note 11, at 106-14.
258. See Pub. L. 104-272, 110 Stat. 3309-13 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313
(Supp. IV 1998)) (establishing uniform health and safety procedures prior, during,
and after each professional boxing match).
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the government is taking a paternalistic attitude toward boxing, which
is capable of handling its own affairs. 9  It is important to note,
however, that the parties making these arguments are boxing's most
powerful promoters and officials of the various sanctioning
organizations, the very parties who will lose their stranglehold on the
sport if federal legislation is enacted.26 One version of this argument
holds that Congress should not become involved in the regulation of a
private industry. 61 But to make this argument is to ignore numerous
bills enacted by Congress that have regulated contractual terms and
working conditions for all employees, without regard to the fact that
the majority of those employees work in private industries.262 Thus,
precedent exists for Congress to step in and regulate private industry
when a group of workers is experiencing exploitation through unfair
and discriminatory practices in relation to wages, working conditions,
and advancement opportunities.
Another argument asserts that the federal government should not
regulate boxing if it plays no part in regulating other sports.263 This
criticism ignores the differences between the structure of the boxing
industry in comparison to other sports,264 especially the fact that
boxing is the only major sport without a uniform governing body or a
representative entity charged with furthering only the interests of the
boxers.2 65 There is simply no other professional sport in which the
athletes are exploited as they are in professional boxing, due to the
lack of independent regulations and uniform standards of treatment.266
259. See, e.g., Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 33 (statement of Walter R.
Stone, General Counsel, IBF) (arguing that Congress's attempt to regulate the
business practices of the boxing industry are "benign racism at worst .. and at best
paternalistic and over reaching").
260. See id.; Crisco, supra note 13, at 1159.
261. See Tim Graham, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: This Could
Change the Sport Forever, KO, Dec. 1998, at 40, 41 (quoting IBF President Bob Lee
as saying "[tjhe senator has gone from talking about health and safety in boxing to
telling the promoter and sanctioning bodies how to do their business. We're private
businesses, and if people don't want to do business with us, they don't have to.").
262. Much of the New Deal Legislation was enacted to protect workers from
exploitation by management during the Great Depression when job opportunities
were scarce, and thus workers had no choice but to assent to management's terms.
See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 201-19) (establishing standards for minimum compensation,
maximum hours per week, overtime compensation, and child labor); see also Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-56 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000el-2000e17 (1994)) (forbidding that compensation, work conditions,
privileges, or terms of employment be effected by an employee's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin).
263. See Bill Brubaker, Controversy Stirs Call for Legislation: New Mexico's
Richardson Seeks to Regulate Boxing, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1990, at C3 (quoting
promoter Don King as saying "[i]f they're going to regulate boxing they should
regulate football, baseball, hockey and basketball.").
264. See supra Part I.B.
265. See Crisco, supra note 13, at 1164.
266. See supra Part I.B.
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The final argument of this nature submits that there are many
other, more important, matters with which Congress should concern
itself, rather than wasting its time regulating boxing.21 This argument,
made before a Senate Committee by an IBF official, 21s illustrates the
attitude that the current power players in boxing have toward the
abuse of their athletes. Though promoters and sanctioning
organization officials may not deem the exploitation of athletes who
literally risk their lives each time they perform to be an important
issue, others, such as Senator John McCain, vehemently disagree!69
The arguments advanced on this theme are weak efforts to deflect
attention away from corrupt promoters and officials, by those who
fear an end to their ability to extract as much money as possible from
the sport, no matter the cost to individual boxers or the public.
While no specific arguments have been advanced against
establishing consistent contractual standards7 that place obligations
on both parties, throughout the hearings on the Ali Act there was
debate over several particular contractual standards at issue!' One
contentious standard was a limitation on the duration of all contracts
between boxers and promoters. Promoters argued in favor of long-
term contracts, stating that after signing a young boxer, promoters
must make a considerable investment in that boxer's development
before he can supply a substantial return.'  Promoters also argued
that longer-term deals, which also include a provision providing a
minimum number of bouts per year, ensures a boxer and his manager
of regular income.273 Congress compromised with promoters on this
issue by allowing long-term contracts in order to maintain the
incentive of investing in young boxers, but limiting option contracts to
267. See Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 33 (statement of Walter R.
Stone, General Counsel, IBF) (arguing that Congress should regulate something
"really important like tug boat operations" (emphasis added)).
268. See id.
269. See id. at 5-6 (statement of Sen. John McCain) (arguing that he is -deeply
committed to seeing what modest and appropriate steps the Congress can take" in an
effort to "protect the rights and welfare of professional boxers by preventing certain
exploitative and coercive business practices").
270. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 25 (testimony of Don
King, boxing promoter) ("Uniformity in commission rules is something no boxing
well-wisher can oppose.").
271. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 42.43
(testimony of Cedric Kushner, boxing promoter) (arguing in favor of long-term and
option contracts).
272. See New York State Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 54-55 (testimony of Don
King, boxing promoter) (arguing against a one-year limit on promotional contracts
because of the investment a promoter must make in a young boxer); Hearings on
Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 41-42 (testimony of Cedric Kushner,
boxing promoter) (same).
273. See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 18, at 42 (testimony
of Cedric Kushner, boxing promoter).
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one year so that promoters do not maintain a stranglehold over a
particular division. 74
Opponents also argue that Congress is missing the mark by
requiring sanctioning organizations to follow objective criteria for
ratings, because each organization "has a different view and
philosophy about what is important in terms of its interests in
boxing. "275 The IBF official who gave this testimony explained that
the IBF was created because U.S. boxing commissioners felt that U.S.
boxers were not being given fair ratings by the other sanctioning
organizations, which are all headquartered outside of the United
States.276 Therefore, the official testified, to say that the IBF gives
preference to American boxers "is not necessarily the case," but
because the organization is located in the United States, it is "a
natural and honest phenomenon" that American boxers be rated
higher than foreign boxers.277 Such an admission illustrates precisely
why federal legislation is required in order to regulate ratings in
professional boxing. The ratings should be based solely on the
fighter's individual merit, not on the fighter's national origin, choice of
promoter, or any other irrelevant criteria.
Many officials of the sanctioning organizations testified that they
are already in compliance with most of the provisions of the Ali Act,
and specifically stated that they maintain written criteria upon which
to base their ratings.278 The ratings criteria cited by each organization
are substantially similar, 79 which is logical when one considers that
there are a limited number of factors that should be considered in
deciding a fighter's rating. The IBF official testified that
recommendations by promoters and managers are considered, 280 but
failed to mention that these recommendations are given more weight
when accompanied by a cash payment.28' By making such arguments,
the sanctioning organizations are again favoring retention of the status
274. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
275. Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 34 (statement of Walter R. Stone,
General Counsel, IBF).
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See, e.g., Hearings on Revision of Boxing Regulation, supra note 20 (statement
of the WBC by Arlen D. Spider Bynum, Legal Counsel, WBC) (stating that the
ratings criteria and changes in ratings are posted on the WBC website each month).
279. See Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 34 (statement of Walter R.
Stone, General Counsel, IBF) (listing as considerations for ratings: the boxer's record,
quality of opposition, level of experience and age, the number and frequency of bouts
against other ranked boxers, periods of inactivity, and the input of people involved in
the boxing industry); cf. WBC Rules and Regulations: Ratings Standards, Rule 6.1
(visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.wbcboxing.com/articles/rules6.htm> (listing similar
criteria and adding several others).
280. See Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 34 (statement of Walter R.
Stone, General Counsel, IBF).
281. See Wharton, supra note 156, at D1; see also supra Part II.B (detailing the
indictment against IBF officials).
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quo, because the current system has proved to be lucrative for them.
The many instances of rankings manipulation, however, clearly
illustrate that the current system must be changed.2e Congress has
made clear through the provisions of the Ali Act aimed at sanctioning
organizations that the rankings process must be governed by a new set
of enforceable rules.
Sanctioning officials also argued that there are currently sufficient
regulations in place to ensure that judges selected to officiate a fight
will render a credible decision.' Specifically, IBF judges are required
to write comments describing why they scored each round for a
particular boxer.' However, in March of 1999, Evander Holyfield
and Lennox Lewis fought for the undisputed heavyweight
championship, and although most observers felt Lewis won nine or
ten of the twelve rounds, the IBF judge, Eugenia Williams, scored the
bout in favor of Holyfield.m Apparently, the IBF's measures alone
are insufficient to guarantee credible decisions. As a result, the All
Act provides the extra safeguards of mandating state commission
approval for the appointment of judges in each bout, and requiring
disclosure of the judges' total compensation.28
Criticism of the Ali Act and other past attempts at the legislation of
boxing come only from the parties who will be adversely effected by
such regulation, because they thrive under the current status quo.'
Specifically, promoters and officials of the sanctioning organizations
have no incentive to change the current system because they maintain
complete control over the sport and are able to manipulate the
athletes for their own financial gain.m The perpetuation of the abuses
discussed in this Note illustrates that until the government steps in and
begins to regulate the sport, boxers will continue to be exploited by
the parties currently in control.
B. Additional Protections That Are Needed
Several additional protections should be enacted in order to
eliminate many of the common practices currently used to take
advantage of boxers. First, representation by adequate counsel, agent,
or management should be mandatory for every negotiation between a
boxer and a promoter. The representative should be required to sign
each document that the boxer signs to ensure that it has been
282. See supra Part II.B.
283. See Hearings on the Ali Act, supra note 48, at 35-36 (statement of Walter R.
Stone, General Counsel, IBF).
284. See iU. at 35.
285. See A Blueprint for Boxing Reform, supra note 41, at 14.
286. See H.R. 1832 § 16.
287. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 212-13.
288. See supra Part II.
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reviewed thoroughly.29  Adequate representation will prevent
situations in which a boxer signs a document that he believes is
materially different from that which he is actually signing, or
situations where the boxer signs an agreement adverse to his legal
interests. 29°
Another addition to the Ali Act should provide that a promotional
agreement contain a definite duration term, not one that is
conditioned on other events. The common term used by major
promoters today is for a specific number of years, which can be
automatically extended if the fighter is recognized as world champion.
The extension covers the boxer's entire title reign plus an additional
two years.29' In effect, this type of provision can force the boxer to
spend his entire career tied to a promoter with whom he may no
longer wish to deal. Also, the fighter's ability to cash in on his success
is severely hampered because unlike other athletes, he may never be
entitled to renegotiate while in the peak of his career. When a
quarterback in the NFL leads his team to a world championship, the
term of his contract is not automatically extended. Instead, if his
contract is nearing its deadline, the player can renegotiate for more
money based on his performance; if the team does not wish to meet
his requests, the player is free to play for another team.
An example of a boxer not being able to capitalize on his career
success is provided in the case of Don King Productions, Inc. v.
Douglas.292 In that case, James Douglas signed an agreement with
Don King, while still a contender, which stated that if Douglas was
ever recognized as world champion, he was to be paid a minimum of
$1 million for each title defense.293 Although $1 million is a
substantial amount of money, it is minimal in comparison to the
revenue that a heavyweight championship fight generates. 294 After
Douglas succeeded in becoming world champion, King offered him
$15 million for his first title defense,295 even though the Mirage Hotel
attempted to negotiate a deal while Douglas that would have provided
him with a $25 million purse.296 Unlike athletes in other sports,
289. Boxers are frequently asked to sign complicated documents, and they usually
rely upon the advice of their manager or promoter. See Hearings on the Ali Act, supra
note 48, at 10 (statement of Mike Tyson, former heavyweight champion of the world)
(stating that over $65 million was taken from him by unscrupulous promoters and
managers).
290. See, e.g., Newfield, supra note 98, at 166 (discussing how Don King had
Muhammad Ali, who was in failing health, sign a release to end a lawsuit for $1.1
million that Ali was allegedly owed under a bout agreement, in exchange for $50,000
cash).
291. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
292. 742 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
293. See id. at 761.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 749.
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Douglas's success actually prevented him from negotiating a better
deal because it automatically extended the term of his contract.
Mandating a definite duration term would force promoters to
negotiate purses in good faith out of fear that the boxer would sign
with a different promoter when the contract expired. A definite
duration term would also allow boxers to pursue all of their
promotional options so that they are guaranteed to receive their true
commercial worth.
Congress should also require that each contract include an itemized
breakdown of which party is responsible for the payment of certain
expenses. Although it is customary that promoters pay all expenses,
they sometimes deduct money from the boxer's purse, claiming
belatedly that the fighter is responsible for some of those expenses.2n
In these circumstances, boxers are often without recourse because
they are wary of filing a suit against a promoter where the result
would be the probable obstruction of their career. An itemized
breakdown of which party is responsible for the payment of certain
expenses would deter promoters from making unexpected deductions
because their obligations would be in writing. In situations where
promoters did make such deductions, the courts would be able to
reach a quicker resolution because the written agreement could
simply be compared to these expenses that were actually deducted
from the boxer's purse. As a supplement to this provision, Congress
should require that the promoter present certified bank checks to the
state commission that will be distributed to the boxers subsequent to
the bout. These provisions, along with the requirement established by
the Act that promoters submit a statement of all agreements and
deductions, will ensure that boxers are always paid exactly what they
are entitled to under their contracts.
A final procedure that Congress should adopt is that all judges be
paid by the state commission from money received by the promoter.
The state commission would make all of the accommodations for the
judges, would compensate them for their services, and would then
submit a total bill to the promoter which would be paid along with all
other expenses of the promotion. By having the state commission pay
the judges, rather than the promoter, the phenomenon of giving one
fighter the advantage because his promoter is responsible for paying
the bout judges would be eliminated, as would the implication of
impropriety each time there is a bad decision.-
297. See, e.g., Newfield, supra note 98, at 233 (detailing the strange deductions
made by King from Tim Witherspoon's purse, a practice which became common
throughout his career).
298. See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
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C. A Private Solution Is the Best Long-Term Solution
The Ali Act must be enacted in order to jumpstart the reform
process in the boxing industry. Without this legislation, the current
holders of power in boxing have no incentive to change the current
structure because they have complete control over the athletes, and
are able to reap massive financial rewards through their exploitative
practices. In the long-term however, there is no reason why boxing
cannot operate through a system similar to those used in the other
major sports. In order to eliminate the exploitation that the Ali Act
seeks to curb, it is not enough to police the current exploiters-the
entire structure of boxing must be changed.
The sport of boxing should implement a structure that represents
the interests of promoters, management, and boxers. An independent
organization should be used to oversee all of the transactions that
occur within the boxing industry, similar to how leagues operate in
team sports.299 All contracts should be registered and reviewed by this
organization, which should also make certain that all parties perform
their obligations under these agreements. The organization would
also rank boxers in each weight division, and provide rules that govern
how the sport is to operate in all capacities. These rules should be
strictly enforced, and disciplinary practices such as fines, bans, and
suspensions should be exacted against all parties who violate the
regulations. While promoters would maintain their current role by
promoting events, and managers or agents would continue to
represent the athletes, these parties would be bound to proceed
according to the rules of the independent organization, thus
eviscerating the exploitation of the boxers. Because boxing is a simple
sport, there is no reason that it cannot be run in an efficient manner,
as long as there is an apparatus in place that provides uniform
standards and enforces them so that they apply equally to all parties.
As in other professional sports, boxing should also establish a union
or association that represents the interests of the boxers. Currently,
there exists a group called the Boxing Organizing Committee
("BOC"), chaired by former middleweight boxer Paul Johnson, and
former light heavyweight champion Jose Torres, that hopes to unite
boxers and provide a voice in deciding how their sport is to be
governed."° The BOC is concerned with the exploitation of boxers
and aims to negotiate with television networks, promoters, and
sanctioning organizations in an effort to change the unethical practices
that have become commonplace in boxing.3"' The BOC is also
299. See supra Part I.B (outlining the differences between the governing
organizations of other professional sports and that of boxing).
300. See Fordham Sports Law Symposium Transcript, supra note 17, at 33-34
(statement of Paul Johnson, Chairman, BOC).
301. See id. at 34.
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interested in establishing a pension fund and medical insurance for all
professional boxers so that they will not be neglected after retiring
from the sport.' As in other professional sports, the existence of a
group to represent the interests of the boxers would protect against
abusive practices, provide greater equity throughout negotiations, and
potentially lead to a system where disputes could be settled
internally 33 Through private governance and dispute resolution,
boxing could join the other major professional sports as a credible
industry.
Establishing an independent "league" and a boxers' union will serve
several purposes.3 4 First, uniform standards will mean that the sport
of boxing is operated in a manner similar to other major sport
industries. The establishment of specific rules that all parties are
required to follow will move boxing in the direction of an efficiently
run business, and away from what it frequently resembles today-an
organized crime organization specializing in extortion and bribery.
Second, the interests of all involved parties will be represented, and a
discontented party will always have an outlet for the resolution of a
dispute through an arbitration process. Third, the rankings and
recognition of world champions will be handled in an unbiased
manner so that boxers with the appropriate skills, not the appropriate
promoter, will be rewarded. Fourth, the exploitative measures
discussed in this Note will be eliminated because all contractual
transactions will be reviewed by the league to make certain that all
parties are in compliance with its rules. And finally, governing the
sport with a private organization that operates in an unbiased manner
will renew public confidence in the sport through a combination of
credible ratings, more competitive matches, and fairer treatment of
the athletes. These conclusions are evidenced by other major
professional sports that are regulated and policed by an independent
league, and that consequently do not suffer from the credibility
problems that plague boxing.
CONCLUSION
Exploitation of professional boxers occurs because the current
system allows promoters and sanctioning organizations to operate
with virtually no restraints. By proceeding without rules that
eliminate unethical conduct, or remedies to address the abuse of
boxers, the current system allows and even rewards corruption.
302. See id. at 33-36.
303. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part I.B (describing the advantages of independent governing
organizations in sports industries).
305. See Ron Borges, Why Are There So Many Mismatches? There's Plenty of
Blame to Spread Around, KO, Feb. 1999, at 44, 47 (quoting Seth Abraham, President,
HBO Sports, as saying "in a strange way the promoters really aren't to blame. They
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Although this Note has highlighted the most notorious parties and the
most highly publicized incidents in boxing, it is important to
remember that even if the current abusers were eliminated, there
would always be others to take their places because the system allows
the exploitation to perpetuate itself. Boxing ills do not simply result
from a few bad apples as some would think, but from a system that
allows the athletes to be exploited by their business associates. The
Ali Act is important because without it, boxing will continue to
operate in the same fashion in which it has for the past century.0 6 The
Ali Act is the vital first step in transforming the industry and
protecting boxers, and will hopefully result in a flood of reform in the
sport of boxing. Promoter Don King has stated that "[o]nce federal
regulation would come into boxing, people like myself would never
have an opportunity to be part of the boxing hierarchy.31 °7 Though
this may be reason enough for Congress to regulate boxing, it is
important to keep sight of the fact that the exploitation will only be
completely eliminated when the system itself is changed. The time
has come to ensure that the only abuse boxers face is that inflicted
inside the ring, not in business transactions outside of it.
take advantage of the open seas of boxing. That's no different than any
businessman.").
306. See Fordham Sports Law Symposium Transcript, supra note 17, at 49
(statement of Louis DiBella, Senior Vice President, HBO Sports) (stating that
passage of the Ali Act is necessary for beneficial changes to occur, and that it is
ridiculous that the Ali Act has not yet been passed).
307. Brubaker, supra note 263.
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